STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

MAINE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
DOCKET NO. BTA-2015-17

[CORPORATE TAXPAYER],
Petitioner
v.

DECISION

MAINE REVENUE SERVICES,
Respondent
[Corporate Taxpayer] (the “Company”), a Maine corporation engaged in the business of
wood harvesting, appeals from an assessment of use tax, interest, and penalties issued against it
by Maine Revenue Services (“MRS”) for the period [Year 5] through [Year 8] following an audit
of the Company’s books and records. The portion of the assessment challenged by the Company
relates to [a number of] pieces of machinery (the “Harvesters”) that it purchased during the audit
period without paying sales tax, and upon which MRS determined use tax was therefore owed
pursuant to 36 M.R.S. §1861. Based on the law and the circumstances presented, we cancel the
penalties contained in the assessment and uphold the remainder of the assessment in full.
I.

Background

This is not the Company’s first experience with MRS’s audit and assessment process. On
[date], MRS issued an assessment against the Company following an audit of the Company’s
books and records for the period [Year 1] through [Year 4]. As a result of that audit, MRS
determined that the Company was liable for use tax, interest, and penalties based on its purchases
of several items of machinery and equipment without paying sales tax. Prior to issuing the
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assessment, however, the MRS auditors removed four items of special mobile equipment1 from
their initial findings—two cranes and two excavators—because the machinery was being used by
the Company directly and primarily in the production for sale of woodchip biofuel and was
therefore sales tax-exempt.2 The auditors also removed a lumber harvesting vehicle—a fellerbuncher—because the Company had purchased the machine at casual sale,3 and removed another
lumber harvesting vehicle—a skidder—because the Company had purchased it at “a trade-even
at a dealer.”4
The present appeal concerns an assessment issued against the Company by MRS on
[date], following an audit of the Company’s books and records for the period [Year 5] through
[Year 8]. As a result of this audit, MRS determined that the Company was again liable for use
tax, interest, and penalties on, among other items, the Company’s purchases of special mobile
equipment—[certain tree harvester machines purchased between the end of Year 5 and the
beginning of Year 6] (the “Harvesters”)—without paying sales tax. After purchase, the
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“Special mobile equipment” is defined as “any self-propelled vehicle not designed or used primarily for the
transportation of persons or property that may be operated or moved only incidentally over the highways, including,
but not limited to road construction or maintenance machinery, farm tractors, lumber harvesting vehicles or loaders,
ditch-digging apparatus, stone crushers, air compressors, power shovels, cranes, graders, rollers, well drillers and
wood sawing equipment.”). 36 M.R.S. § 1752(14-B).
2

Pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 1760(31)(A), “no tax on sales, storage or use may be collected upon or in connection with
. . . [s]ales of machinery and equipment . . . [f]or use by the purchaser directly and primarily in the production of
tangible personal property intended to be sold or leased ultimately for final use or consumption . . . .”
3

A “casual sale” is “an isolated transaction in which tangible personal property or a taxable service is sold other
than in the ordinary course of repeated and successive transactions of like character by the person making the sale.”
36 M.R.S. § 1752 (1-D). With certain exceptions, casual sales of tangible personal property are not subject to sales
or use tax. 36 M.R.S. §§ 1811, 1752(11)(B)(1), 1764. Pursuant to section 1752(14-B), a feller-buncher is classified
as “special mobile equipment,” which is generally subject to use tax at casual sale. Id. § 1764. However, section
1764 specifically provides that “[f]or purposes of this section [imposing use tax at casual sale], ‘special mobile
equipment’ does not include farm tractors and lumber harvesting vehicles or loaders.” (Emphasis added).
4

Pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 1765, when an item of special mobile equipment such as a skidder is “traded in toward the
sale price of another item in that same category, sales tax is levied only upon the difference between the sale price of
the purchased property and the trade-in allowance of the property taken in trade.” In the case of an even trade, the
difference subject to tax would be zero.
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Company used the Harvesters to sever trees from the earth for use in producing woodchip
biomass fuel. The Company timely requested that MRS reconsider the penalty portion of the
assessment in the amount of $[amount]; however, MRS upheld the assessment in full on [date].
The Company then filed its timely appeal with the Board, requesting to be relieved of the
aforesaid penalties as well as the assessed interest in the amount of $[amount]. Additionally,
prior to the appeals conference, the Company submitted a written argument wherein it requested
that the Board also cancel the assessed tax of $[amount], in addition to the interest and penalties,
for a total of $[amount].
The issues raised by the Company on appeal are (1) whether use tax was incorrectly
assessed on the Company’s purchases of the Harvesters, and (2) if the tax were correctly
assessed, whether the interest and penalties contained in the assessment should otherwise be
abated. It is the Company’s burden to show that it is more likely than not that the tax, interest, or
penalties contained in the assessment should be abated. 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(F).
MRS also argues that the Board does not have the authority to consider the Company’s
challenges to the assessed tax and interest, whereas the Company did not raise those portions of
the assessment in its request for MRS reconsideration under 36 M.R.S. § 151.
II.
1.

Discussion

Jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals
As a threshold matter, MRS contends that the Board’s scope of review on appeal is

limited to the issues raised or addressed in the reconsidered decision issued to the Company by
MRS. Specifically, MRS argues that because the Company did not ask MRS to reconsider the
tax and interest portions of the assessment, the Board is without authority to consider anything
beyond the assessed penalties that MRS reconsidered. MRS reasons that the “doctrine of
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exhaustion of administrative remedies” and its corollary, “the failure to preserve” rule, require a
party to first present its arguments and claims to the agency so that the agency has the
opportunity to make a determination prior to appeal. See New Eng. Whitewater Center, Inc. v.
Dep‘t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 550 A.2d 56, 58-59 (Me. 1988) (“Generally, plaintiffs in a
Rule 80C proceeding for review of final agency action are expected to raise any objections they
have before the agency in order to preserve these issues for appeal. Issues not raised at the
administrative level are deemed unpreserved for appellate review.”). As stated in New Eng.
Whitewater,
the rule requiring that an issue be raised before the administrative agency in order
for it to be preserved on appeal is not specifically based on a need for factfinding.
Rather, it is based on “simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of
administration, and to litigants,” and ensures that the agency and not the courts
has the first opportunity to pass upon the claims of the litigants.
Id. at 60 (citations omitted). As we explain below, we disagree that the scope of our review is
limited as suggested by MRS.
The jurisdiction of the Board is governed by 36 M.R.S. § 151. A person subject to and
aggrieved by an assessment or determination by MRS may request that MRS reconsider that
assessment or determination. Id. § 151(1). Where a request for reconsideration does not involve
an amount in controversy of less than $1,000, MRS’s decision on reconsideration is “subject to
review either by the [B]oard or directly by the Superior Court.” Id. § 151(2)(E). If the
jurisdictional dollar amount is satisfied and all timeliness requirements are met,5 “the board or
Superior Court shall conduct a de novo hearing and make a de novo determination of the merits
of the case.” Id. § 151(2)(G) (emphasis added). Prior to the 1991 revision of 36 M.R.S. § 151
5

A person subject to an assessment by MRS must request reconsideration, if at all, within 60 days after receipt of
notice of the assessment. 36 M.R.S. § 151(1). A person who wishes to appeal an MRS-reconsidered decision to the
Maine Board of Tax Appeals or to the Superior Court must do so within 60 days after receipt of the reconsidered
decision. Id. § 151(2)(F).
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(effective June 30, 1992), MRS’s reconsideration decisions were reviewed “by the Superior
Court in accordance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, except that the absence of a
record shall be resolved exclusively by a hearing de novo on review.” Jackson Adver. Corp. v.
State Tax Assessor, 551 A.2d 1365, n.1 (Me. 1988). In construing the pre-revision version of
section 151, the Law Court stated that
[a]lthough 36 M.R.S.A. § 151 permits a de novo hearing for the purpose of
providing a substituted record for judicial review, a de novo determination, such
as that undertaken by the judge in this case, is not authorized. Even with a de
novo hearing under section 151, judicial review is confined to a “complete review
of questions of law and to limited review of questions of fact only to test the
reasonableness of the conclusions reached.”
Jackson Adver. Corp. at 1366 (citing Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167, 170 (Me.
1974)). The legislature’s 1991 revision of section 151, however, added the requirement that
“[t]he Superior Court shall conduct a de novo hearing and make a de novo determination of the
merits of the case.” Serv. & Erection Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 1, 2 (Me. 1996) (citing
P.L. 1991, ch. 873, § 3) (emphasis added). This new language is the same language now
applicable to the Board under current section 151(2)(G). The Law Court has also construed the
effect of the new statutory language of section 151:
Because 36 M.R.S.A. § 151 expressly requires that the Superior Court conduct a
“de novo hearing and make a de novo determination” of the merits of the case,
we reason[ ] that the Superior Court “no longer functions in an appellate capacity
. . . [but rather] functions as the forum of origin for a determination of both facts
and law.” [Serv. & Erection Co.] at 2 (quoting Enerquin Air, Inc. v. State Tax
Assessor, 670 A.2d 926, 928 (Me. 1996)).
Underwood v. City Of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 ¶ 20, 715 A.2d 148. Neither the plain
language of the statute nor that of the Court quoted above limits the scope of our review on
appeal to those issues taken up during agency reconsideration. Rather, as to those cases meeting
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the jurisdictional requisites, both the Board and the Superior Court, respectively,6 serve as
forums of origin regarding the assessment or determination as to which the person subjected is
aggrieved under section 151(1). We are aware of no provision of law, and none has been
provided, showing that the scope of our review is limited to the issues identified by the parties on
MRS reconsideration.7 We therefore proceed to address the merits of the assessment in this case.
2.

Abatement of Tax
The tax amount at issue in this appeal relates to the Harvesters that the Company

purchased in late [Year 5] and in early [Year 6]. The Company argues that the Harvesters are
exempt from sales and use tax because they were used directly and primarily in the production of
woodchip biomass fuel for sale.
Maine sales tax “is imposed on the value of all tangible personal property . . . sold at
retail in this State.” 36 M.R.S. § 1811. Where no sales tax is collected and paid, 36 M.R.S. §
1861 imposes a use tax “on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible
personal property” that would otherwise be subject to Maine sales tax if purchased in this state.
An exemption from sales and use tax is provided under 36 M.R.S. § 1760(31) for machinery and
equipment purchased for use by the purchaser “directly and primarily in the production of
tangible personal property intended to be sold.” For purposes of the exemption, however, the
definition of “production” does not include “wood harvesting operations.” 36 M.R.S. § 1752(9B). See Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 540 A.2d 770, 772 (Me. 1988) (“[W]ood
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A final decision of the Board may be appealed to the Superior Court de novo by either the taxpayer or
MRS. In that event, “[t]he court shall make its own determination as to all questions of fact or law,
regardless of whether the questions of fact or law were raised before the division within the bureau making
the original determination or before the board.” 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(I).
7

It should be noted that the scope of our review in no way impairs MRS’s attempts “to resolve issues with the
petitioner through informal discussion and settlement negotiations with the objective of narrowing the issues for an
appeals conference or court review,” as provided in 36 M.R.S. § 151(2)(B).

6

harvesting operations are specifically excluded from the definition of production by the third
paragraph of section 1752(9-B). Although the . . . statute does not define ‘wood harvesting
operations,’ . . . the plain and natural meaning of the term includes not only the cutting of the
tree, but the removal of the limbs as well.”). The Company has not shown that its purchases of
the Harvesters were exempt from sales and use tax during the period at issue as being used in
production under section 1760(31).8 No adjustment to the assessment is warranted on this basis.
3.

Abatement of Penalties
The assessment contains substantial understatement penalties in connection with the

Company’s failure to report and pay use tax on its purchases of the Harvesters. 36 M.R.S. § 187B(4-A). Cancellation and abatement of penalties is governed by 36 M.R.S. § 187-B, which
provides that MRS “shall waive or abate” any penalty if the taxpayer supplies “reasonable cause”
for doing so. Reasonable cause includes, but is not limited to, any of the circumstances listed in
section 187-B(7).9 Here, the Company argues that the subject penalties should be abated because
MRS led it to believe during its previous audit that purchases of Harvesters would be sales taxexempt. See 36 M.R.S. § 187-B(7)(A) (penalties abated where failure to file or pay resulted
directly from erroneous information provided by MRS). Prior to the period on appeal, MRS had
advised the Company that the purchase of machinery and equipment for use in the production of
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Effective July 1, 2013, P.L. 2011, ch. 657 § N-2 amended 36 M.R.S. § 2013, permitting a sales tax exemption for
purchases of “depreciable machinery or equipment, for use in . . . commercial wood harvesting.” Because the
Company purchased the Harvesters prior to the effective date of that amendment, however, its purchases are not
eligible for that exemption.
9

Under 18-674 C.M.R. 100 § 203(5) (May 1, 2014) (Board Rule 100 section 203(5)), we take official notice that
MRS also has an internal policy whereby it does not impose substantial understatement penalties on audit if (1) the
understatement is discovered during a taxpayer’s first audit or (2) the understatement relates to an issue that was not
addressed on a prior audit. In this case, MRS disallowed trade-in credits in the amount of $[amount] against the sale
price of the Harvesters. Although trade-in credit appears to be a “first time issue” on audit for the Company, it is not
known why MRS did not grant relief from the substantial understatement penalties under its policy.
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woodchip biomass fuel was exempt from sales tax. The Company contends that because it
purchased and used the Harvesters to sever trees from the earth in the production of woodchip
biomass fuel, the penalties at issue should be cancelled. In support of its position, the Company
relies on MRS’s prior audit determination that no sales tax was due on the Company’s purchase
of a feller-buncher which, similar to the Harvesters, was used to sever trees from the earth at the
beginning of the woodchip biomass fuel production process. See footnote 3, above. This
argument illustrates the Company’s misunderstanding regarding the taxability of lumber
harvesting machinery and equipment when purchased at casual sale, as well as the Company’s
misunderstanding of the time when production commences for purposes of the exemption for
machinery and equipment purchased for use in production.10
We find that, although MRS did not directly mislead the Company regarding the
applicability of the tax exemption for machinery and equipment used in production—which did
not extend to machinery and equipment such as the Harvesters that sever trees from the earth—
MRS did not sufficiently ensure during its prior audit that the Company understood the different
tax treatments for such machinery and equipment, as more fully described in footnotes 1 through
4, above. Based upon the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Company had
reasonable cause to understate its use tax liability regarding its purchase of the Harvesters.
Accordingly, we cancel the penalties contained in the assessment. Cf. John Swenson Granite,
Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 685 A.2d 425, 429 (Me. 1996) (penalties were properly upheld where
the taxpayer had been the subject of two previous audits and was on notice that MRS considered
their sales taxable). No further adjustment is warranted.
10

As provided by 18-125 C.M.R. 303 § 1(1) (January 29, 2007), “‘[p]roduction’ as used in Sec. 1752(9-B)
commences with the movement of raw materials to the first production machine after their receipt and storage at the
production site (after receipt if the raw materials are not stored) and ends with the completion of the finished
product. . . . The acquisition of raw materials . . . do[es] not constitute production.” (Emphasis added).
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4.

Abatement of Interest
The Company also requests that the interest contained in the assessment be abated.

Interest accrues automatically on the amount of tax due, calculated from the last date prescribed
for payment and is compounded monthly. 36 M.R.S. § 186. MRS may waive the interest if the
failure to pay the tax at issue “is explained to the satisfaction” of MRS. Id. As recognized by the
Maine Law Court, the interest requirement
supports the reasonable purpose that the investment value of money retained by
late payment of taxes should benefit the State, not the individual or entity that
delayed payment. However, “[i]f [a taxpayer's] failure to pay a tax when required
is explained to the satisfaction of [MRS], [MRS] may abate or waive the payment
of all or any part of that interest.” 36 M.R.S. § 186. This statutory language
indicates legislative intent to confer upon [MRS] broad discretion to waive or
abate the interest due on an unpaid tax when the delayed payment is satisfactorily
explained.
Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC v. State Tax Assessor, 2012 ME 32 ¶ 8, 39 A.3d 65. The language of
section 186 “indicates a highly discretionary standard that is not easily met by the taxpayer.” Id.
¶ 14. Here, the Company has not met its burden of explaining satisfactorily its failure to pay
sales tax on its purchases of the Harvesters when due. Consequently, the Board is unable to
abate the interest assessed. No adjustment is warranted.
III.

DECISION

Based on the evidence presented and for the reasons stated above, the penalties contained
in the assessment are cancelled in full. We uphold the remainder of the assessment, consisting of
tax and associated interest.
The Board may, in limited circumstances, reconsider its decision on any appeal. If either
party wishes to request reconsideration, that party must file a written request with the Board
within 20 days of receiving this decision. Contact the Appeals Office at 207-287-2864 or see the
Board’s rules, available at http://www.maine.gov/boardoftaxappeals/lawsrules/, for more
9

information on when the Board may grant reconsideration. If no request for reconsideration is
filed within 20 days of the date of this proposed decision, it will become the Board’s final
administrative action. If either party wishes to appeal the Board’s decision in this matter to the
Maine Superior Court, that party must do so within 60 days of receiving this decision. During
the 60-day period in which an appeal may be filed with the Superior Court, the Company may
contact Maine Revenue Services at 207-624-9725 for the amount of tax that is currently due,
together with any interest or penalties owed. After that 60-day period has expired, Maine
Revenue Services will contact the Company with an updated amount of tax and any interest or
penalties due at that time.

Issued by the Board: June 20, 2016
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